Do Paper Trails fail to secure e-Voting?

The ITIF foundation has postulated that paper trails do not by themselves secure e-Voting. Naturally nothing is a "magic bullet", and any component of a voting solution has to be carefully integrated into the other parts to ensure it provides a complete capability.

The counter argument produced by OVS does indeed show precisely how a secure solution is achieved using off-the-shelf computer components today - with verifiable paper ballots - simply and cost effectively.

Also included in the document is excerpts from the NIST/EAC work on software independence and how that is achieved using verifiable paper ballots.

The ITIF arguments can be found here: http://www.innovationpolicy.org/index.php?id=79
These seem mainly aimed at justifying research funding than any serious attempt to discredit paper. They also point up the need to secure voting record delivery and verification during the counting and totalling process, with an obvious hope that government funding for this area will be forthcoming.